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Abstract
The paper shows that the basis for the construction of "natural" classifications, "natural" concepts and 
integrated information is the same property of the objects of the external world - the high correlation 
of attributes describing the objects of "natural" classes. The hypothesis that the information processes 
of the brain and mind tuned in the course of evolution to extract highly correlated structure attributes 
of "natural" objects by forming "natural" concepts of the objects was suggested. This hypothesis is 
justified by references to a number of famous works. Besides, the original mathematical model is 
proposed, which formalizes the "natural" classifications, "natural" concepts and the integrated 
information by G.Tononi, based on a mathematical representation of the system, closed upon itself by 
causal relationships that form a certain "resonance" of mutual predictions of highly correlated set of 
attributes of objects  of "natural" classes. The results of computer modeling of building "natural" 
classes and concepts for coded digits are introduced. 
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1 Introduction 
The structure of the objects of the external world was first analyzed in the form of "natural" 
classifications (see, section 2). It was noted that "natural" classes of animals or plants have a 
potentially infinite number of different properties [7]. Naturalists who were building "natural" 
classifications, also noted that the higher the number of essential attributes objects being compared 
which were similar, the more likely that there was similarity in other attributes, and the construction of 
a "natural" classification was just indication: from an infinite number of attributes you need to pass to 
the limited number of them, which would replace all other attributes [19-6]. This means that in 
"natural" classes these attributes are strongly correlated, for example, if there are 128 classes and their 
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 attributes are binary, then the independent "indicator" attributes among them will be about 7 attributes 
as 27 = 128, and others can be determined depending on these 7 attributes. 
The high correlation of attributes for "natural" classes was also confirmed in cognitive studies 
(section 3). Eleanor Rosch has formulated the principles of categorization, one of which reads: "the 
perceived world is not an unstructured set of properties found with equal probability; on the contrary, 
the objects of perceived world have highly correlated structure" [11-15]. Therefore, directly perceived 
objects (so called basic objects) are observed and functional ligaments, rich with information.  Later, 
Bob Rehder suggested a theory of causal models, in which the relation of the object to a category is 
based not on a set of attributes but on the proximity of generating causal mechanisms: "the object is 
classified as a member of a certain category to the extent that its properties are likely to have been 
generated by this category causal laws" [9]. Thus, the structure of causal relationships between the 
attributes of objects is taken as a basis of the classification. To formalize the causal models, Bob 
Rehder proposed the use of causal graphical models (CGMs). However, these models are based on the 
«deployment» of Bayesian networks which do not allow cycles. 
The main hypothesis of this study: Information processes of the brain and mind were tuned in the 
course of evolution to extract a highly correlated structure of the "natural" object attributes by 
forming a "natural" concept of the object. 
This is confirmed by the works of G.Tononi (section 4), who determines consciousness through the 
concept of integrated information (information generated by the system through the causal interaction 
between its parts) [5]. However, he considers integrated information as an intrinsic property of the 
system. Unlike G.Tononi, we consider integrated information as the ability of a system to reflect the 
high correlation of the object attributes from "natural" classes, and consciousness as the ability of 
complex hierarchical reflection of the "natural" classification of objects from the external world.  
We suggest a fundamentally new mathematical apparatus for the unified formalization of 
integrated information, "natural" classifications and "natural" concepts based on direct formalization 
of "resonance" of causal relationships. We assume that the brain carries out all possible conclusions on 
causality, reflecting the highly correlated structure of the objects from the external world. These causal 
connections in the perception of the "natural" objects are closed upon themselves, forming certain 
"resonance", which is a system with highly integrated information as G.Tononi suggests. At the same 
time, "resonance" occurs, if and only if these causal relationships reflect some integrity of some 
"natural" object, in which a potentially infinite number of attributes mutually presuppose each other.  
ɋycles  of conclusions on the causal relations emerging with this, are mathematically described by 
the "fixed points" (see Section 5). These points are characterized by the property, that the application 
of the conclusions towards the considered properties does not predict new properties. The set of 
mutually predicted properties, received at the fixed point, produces "image" or prototype of the class. 
Therefore, the brain perceives the "natural" object not as a set of attributes, but as a "resonant" system 
of causal connections, closing upon itself through the simultaneous inference of the total aggregate of 
the "image" or prototype features, which are forming a consistent pattern. Section 6 provides a 
computer modeling of fixed points, "natural" classes, "natural" concepts and integrated information on 
the example of coded digits. 
2 "Natural" classification 
The first sufficiently detailed philosophical analysis of "natural" classification belongs to John St. 
Mill [7]. This analysis describe all the basic properties of  "natural" classifications, which were later 
confirmed by naturalists who were building  "natural" classifications and also by researchers in 
cognitive sciences, who were investigating the "natural" concept. 
According to John St. Mill [7] "artificial" classifications differ from the "natural" in that they may 
be based on any one or more attributes, so that different classes differ only in inclusion of objects, 
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 having different values of these attributes. But if we consider classes of "animals" or "plants", they 
differ by such a large (potentially infinite) number of properties that they can't be enumerated. 
Furthermore, all these properties will be based on statements, confirming this distinction. At the same 
time, among the properties of some "natural" classes, there will be both observable and non-
observable attributes. To take into account the hidden attributes, we must find their causal exhibitions 
in the observed attributes. "For example, the natural classification of animals should be based mainly 
on their internal structure; however, it would be strange, as noted by A.Comte, if we were able to 
determine the family and specie of one or another animal, only by killing it" [7]. 
James. St. Mill gives the following definition of "natural" classification: it is such a classification, 
which combines the objects into the groups, about which we can make the greatest number of common 
propositions, and it is based on such properties, which are causes of many others, or at least make their 
true attributes. He also defines the "image" of the class, which is the forerunner of the "natural" 
concepts: "our concept of class, the way in which this class is represented in our mind, is the concept 
of some sample, having all attributes of this class in the highest ... degree". 
John St. Mill's arguments were confirmed by naturalists. For example, W. Whewell stated that 
"The more general statements about the objects make it possible to state a classification, the more it is 
natural" [6]. Furthermore, L. Rutkowski writes [17] about inexhaustible number of general properties 
of the "natural" classes: "The more essential attributes are similar in comparable objects, the more 
likely they are the similar in other attributes". Smirnov E.S. [19] makes a similar statement: "The 
taxonomic problem is in indication: "from an infinite number of attributes we need to pass to a limited 
number of them, which would replace all other attributes." 
As a result, there were formulated a problem of a "natural" classifications definition, which is still 
being discussed in the literature [20,27]. However, from our point of view, there is not enough 
adequate formalization of the "natural" classification until now. 
3 Principles of categorization in cognitive sciences 
In the works of Eleanor Rosch [11-15] the principles of categorization of "natural" categories, 
confirming statements of John St. Mill and naturalists, are formulated on the basis of the experiments:  
“Cognitive Economy. The first principle contains the almost common-sense notion that, as an 
organism, what one wishes to gain from one's categories is a great deal of information about the 
environment while conserving finite resources as much as possible ».  
«Perceived World Structure. The second principle of categorization asserts that … perceived 
world – is not an unstructured total set of equiprobable co-occurring attributes. Rather, the material 
objects of the world are perceived to possess … high correlational structure. … In short, combinations 
of what we perceive as the attributes of real objects do not occur uniformly. Some pairs, triples, etc., 
are quite probable, appearing in combination sometimes with one, sometimes another attribute; others 
are rare; others logically cannot or empirically do not occur». 
It is understood that the first principle is not possible without the second – the cognitive economy 
is not possible without a structured world. «Natural» objects (basic objects) are rich with information 
ligaments of observed and functional properties, which form a natural discontinuity, creating 
categorization. These ligaments form a prototypes of the objects of different classes ("images" of John 
St. Mill): «Categories can be viewed in terms of their clear cases if the perceiver places emphasis on 
the correlational structure of perceived attributes … By prototypes of categories we have generally 
meant the clearest cases of category membership» [14-15]. «Rosch and Mervis (1975) have shown 
that the more prototypical of a category a member is rated, the more attributes it has in common with 
other members of the category and the fewer attributes in common with members of the contrasting 
categories» [12-13].  
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 In future the theory of "natural" concepts suggested by Eleanor Rosch where called the 
Prototypical Theory of Concepts (Prototype Theory). Its main features are described as follows: «The 
prototype view (or probabilistic view) keeps the attractive assumption that there is some underlying 
common set of features for category members but relaxes the requirement that every member have all 
the features. Instead, it assumes there is a probabilistic matching process: Members of the category 
have more features, perhaps weighted by importance, in common with the prototype of this category 
than with prototypes of other categories» [16]. 
Unfortunately, in this formulation categorization principles, formulated by Eleanor Rosch and 
speaking about the reflection in the "natural" concepts of the highly correlated structure of the external 
world are fade.  
In further studies it was found that models based on attributes, similarities and prototypes are not 
enough to describe classes. It is therefore necessary to take into account the theoretical, causal and 
ontological knowledge, relating to the objects of classes. For example, people do not only know that 
birds have wings and can fly, and build their nests in trees, but also facts, that the birds build their 
nests in trees, because they can fly, and fly because they have wings. 
Many researchers believe that the most important theoretical knowledge is the knowledge of causal 
dependencies because of its functionality. It allows the organism to interfere in external events and to 
gain control over the environment. Studies have shown that people's knowledge of categories isn't 
limited by the list of properties, and includes a rich set of causal relationships between these 
properties, which can be ranked. The importance of these properties also depends on the category 
causal relationships. It was shown in some experiments [1,18],  that property is more important in 
classification, if it more included in causal network of features relationships. In other [8] experiments 
it was shown, that the property is more important, if it have more reasons. 
Considering these studies, Bob Rehder proposed the theory of causal models (causal-model 
theory), according to which: «people’s intuitive theories about categories of objects consist of a model 
of the category in which both a category’s features and the causal mechanisms among those features 
are explicitly represented. In other words, theories might make certain combinations of features either 
sensible and coherent … in light of the relations linking them, and the degree of coherence of a set of 
features might be an important factor determining membership in a category» [9]. 
In the theory of causal models, the relationship of the object to a category is based not on a set of 
attributes or similarity based on attributes, but on the basis of similarity of generating causal 
mechanisms: «Specifically, a to-be-classified object is considered a category member to the extent that 
its features were likely to have been generated by the category’s causal laws, such that combinations 
of features that are likely to be produced by a category’s causal mechanisms are viewed as good 
category members and those unlikely to be produced by those mechanisms are viewed as poor 
category members. As a result, causal-model theory will assign a low degree of category membership 
to objects that have many broken feature correlations (i.e., cases where causes are present but effects 
absent or vice versa). Objects that have many preserved correlations (i.e., causes and effects both 
present or both absent) will receive a higher degree of category membership because it is just such 
objects that are likely to be generated by causal laws» [9]. 
To represent causal knowledge some researchers have used Bayesian networks and causal models 
[2,3-4]. However, these models cannot simulate the cyclic causality because the Bayesian networks do 
not support cycles. 
In his work [10] Bob Rehder proposed a model of causal cycles, based on the "disclosure" of 
causal graphical models. "Disclosure" is fulfilled by creating a Bayesian network which unfolds in 
time. Such a network works well for a simulation of "natural" concepts reflecting a highly correlated 
structure of the external world. However, it not exactly formalize the cycles of causality. 
Our model is directly based on cyclic causal connections, represented by fundamentally new 
mathematical models – fixed points of predictions on causations. 
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 4 Consciousness as integrated information 
If "natural" classification describes the objects of the external world, and that of cognitive science, 
the perception of the objects in the external world then the integrated information theory of 
consciousness by G.Tononi examines information processes of the brain on the perception of the 
objects in the external world.  
G.Tononi defines consciousness as the primary concept, which has the following 
phenomenological characteristics: composition, information, integration, exclusion [5]. For a more 
accurate determination of these properties G.Tononi introduces the concept of integrated information 
"integrated information characterizing the reduction of uncertainty is the information, generated by the 
system that comes in a certain state after the causal interaction between its parts, which is superior 
information generated independently by its parts themselves" [5].  
In terms of integrated information, phenomenological properties are formulated as follows. In 
brackets we give the interpretation of these properties from the point of view of the "natural" 
classification. 
1. Composition - elementary mechanisms (causal interactions) can be combined into higher-order 
ones (forming "natural" classes in the form of causal loops and a hierarchy of "natural" classes); 
2. Information - only mechanisms that specify “differences that make a difference” within a system 
count (only a system of “resonating” causal relationships, forming a class is important. See the 
illustration of the example below); 
3. Integration - only information irreducible to non-interdependent components counts (only 
system of "resonating" causal relations, indicating an excess of information and the perception of 
highly correlated structures of "natural" object counts); 
4. Exclusion – only the maximum of integrated information counts (i.e the values of attributes, that 
are mostly interrelated by causal relationships, form the "image" or prototype). 
As G.Tononi doesn't consider a "natural" classification of objects in the external world, these 
properties are defined as the intrinsic properties of the system. 
We consider these properties not as intrinsic properties of the system, but as the ability of the 
system to reflect the complexes of external object causal relations and that consciousness as the ability 
of a complex hierarchical reflection of a "natural" classification of the external world.  
Let's consider the process of reflection of causal relationships (fig. 1). It includes: 
1. The objects of the external world (cars, boats, berths) which relate to certain "natural" classes; 
2. The process of the brain reflection of objects and the way they are linked by causal relations 
marked by blue lines; 
3. The association of excited brain structures in the systems, indicated by the green ovals. 
In G.Tononi's theory only the third point of reflection is considered. The totality of the excited 
groups of neurons form a maximally integrated conceptual structure that defined by G.Tononi as 
qualia. Integrated information is considered as a system of cyclic causality. However, it remains 
unclear what represents integrated information. 
Fig 1: Brain reflection of causal relationships between objects attributes. 
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 We hypothesize that the "natural" classification, "natural" concepts and integrated information by 
G.Tononi are described by the same formulization and are identical to each other. The brain with the 
help of integrated information is adjusted to the perception of "natural" objects of the external world. 
This requires a fundamentally new formalism which is described below. 
5 Unified formalization of «natural» classification, «natural» 
concepts, and consciousness as integrated information 
We suggest that the brain carries out all possible conclusions that can be drawn from the causal 
relationships representing a highly correlated structure of the external world. Then the cycles of 
conclusions which emerge during this process, are described mathematically by fixed points for which 
we can not further draw new properties. A set of mutually predicting  properties, received at the fixed 
point, gives an “image” of a class or prototype. If we discover all fixed points using all possible causal 
relations, observed on a set of objects, then we get the "natural" classification of these objects. 
The inference of some fact by the causal relations is a probabilistic (inductively-statistical) 
prediction. Then inferences in the fixed points will be fixed points of predictions. However, the 
inference of predictions by the inductive-statistical inference faces the problem of statistical 
ambiguity, when in the process of inductive inference (training) we receive rules, which infer a 
contradiction: some property must exist and but not exist at the same time.  
And thus a non-trivial problem arises: to define causal relationships, prediction and fixed points 
such that contradictions do not arise. 
We solved this problem by definition of a special semantic probabilistic inference of causal 
relationships, which provided the necessary mathematical results: 
1. it was proved that semantic probabilistic inference discover causal relationships as maximally-
specific rules, which solve the statistical ambiguaty problem and predict without 
contradictions [21-22]; 
2. it was proved that  fix-points, which base on maximally-specific rules are consistent [21-22]; 
3. it was proved that fix-points, which base on maximally-specific rules, are probabilistic 
generalization of the notion of formal concepts [24-25]; 
4. semantic probabilistic inference satisfy the D.Hebb rule, and may be considered as a formal 
model of neuron. In that case fix-points, based on maximally-specific rules may be considered 
as neural cells assemblies [23]. 
Let – the set of properties of an object ɚ, as defined by a set of predicates, and 
 – the set of the maximally-specific conditioned connections satisfied 
for properties X, { . Then the prediction operator Pr can be written as follows [
X(a)
1 ki i
.& P
0i
(P &.. P ) MS(X) 
1 ki i
P ,..., P } X 26]: 
where )  – is  the operator, modifying the set of attributes X by adding or removing some of the 
attributes, so that the certain criteria f mutual consistency of attributes X predictions by causal 
relations was maximized. Kri ormation integration o ttributes in its own way 
in the system of causal relationships MS(X) , in comparison to the theory suggested by G.Tononi. The 
fixed point is reached when n 1 nPr (X(a)) Pr (X(a))  , for some n, where nPr – n multiple application 
of the operator Pr. Since in each application of the operator Pr the value of Krit criterion increases and  
in the fixed point reaches a local maximum, then the fixed point, when reflecting some "natural" 
0 1 k 0 0 1 k 0Krit i i i i i i i i
Pr(X) (X {P | (P &...& P P ) MS(X)} { P | (P &...& P P ) MS(X)}), )       
Krit (X)
 Krit o
t criterion measures inf f a
object, has a maximum integrated information and property of «exclusion» by G.Tononi. However, 
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 b)
a) c)
Fig. 2. Digits coding. 
Ɋɢɫ. 3. Fix-point of the digit 6. 
xternal estimates) a set of attributes of the 
"im
ibing
nference. They are general statements about 
the
fter the
digit a in the cell 13 (see fig. 3a) have a line 6 (see fig. 3b), and predicate is true, then it must 
the fundamental difference between this approach and the theory of G.Tononi is that the system of 
causal relations at a fixed point forms by itself (without e
age" or prototype while perceiving the "natural" class. 
Let's illustrate the formation of fixed points by the computer experiment for the detection of 
"natural" classes/concepts of coded digits. Let's encode the digits, as it is shown in fig. 2, where a) 24 
features, describing the digits, and b) 7 predicates for each feature, descr  the type of line in the 
corresponding cell (or blank cell). Thus, we have 24*7 predicates ijP (a) , i=1,…,24; j=1,…,7, 
describing a digit a. We will form a training set, consisting of 360 shuffled digits (12 digits of fig. 2, 
which are duplicated in 30 copies without specifying where any digit is). In this set 55089 maximum 
specific regularities were found by semantic probabilistic i
 objects, mentioned by John St. Mill and W. Whewell. 
According to these regularities we discovered exactly 12 fixed points, accurately corresponding to 
the digits. An example of a fixed point for the digit 6 is shown in fig. 3. Let's consider what this fixed 
point is. The first regularity of digit 6 in fig. 3, represented in the first box a  brace, means that if 
13,6P (a)  
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 be a line 2 in the cell 3, and predicate  is true. The predicted attribute  is indicated by a 
dotted line. Let's write this regularity as   . It is easy to see that this regularity is 
really implemented for all the digits. The second regularity means, that from the line 5 in the cell 9 
 is true) and the absent of the line 5 in the cell 1 (the negation of the predicate  is 
true) follows the line 7 in the cell 4 (  is true). Denial is denoted by a dash line, as shown at the 
bottom of fig. 3. Thus we get a regularity P ( &
3,2P (a)
13,6P (
4,7P (a)
9,5
3,2P (a)
a)
a)
3,2P (a)
1,5P (a)
9,5(P (a) 1,5P (a)
   . Following 3 regularities in 
the first row of the digit 6, will be respectively (   ), ( &   
), (   ).  
4,7P (a)
4,7P (a)13,6P (a) 17,5P (a) 13,5P (a)
4,7P (a) 13,6P (a) 16,7P (a)
Fig. 3 shows, that these regularities and attributes of digit 6 form a fixed point. They mutually 
predict each other. Let's note, that regularities, used in the fixed point, are discovered on all figures, 
but fixed point (as a system in terms of G.Tononi) discriminate only one digit. This illustrates the 
phenomenological property 2 which states that “differences (regularites) that make a difference (fix-
points)”. Thus, the system of causal relationships perceives (is conscious of) a whole object. Thus 
digits are identified not by regularities themselves, but their system relationships. 
The fixed point forms a prototype by Eleanor Rosch, or "image" by John St. Mill. The program 
does not know in advance which possible combinations of attributes are correlated with each other.  
6 Conclusion 
Suggested unified formalization confirm the proposed main hypothesis about the brain information 
processes, because it possess all properties that exhibits by these three theories: strong correlation of 
the attributes of "natural" classes by the set of regularities that forming the fix-point; object is 
considered a category member to the extent that its features are generated in the fix-point by the 
category’s causal laws (regularities); the set of mutually predicted properties, received at the fixed 
point, produces "image" or prototype of the class and provide the property of maximum integrated 
information as it considers in criteria Krit. 
 
Acknowledgment. The work on behavioral experiments with laboratory animals was supported by the 
Russian Scientific Foundation No. 14-14-00269. Mathematical investigations and computer 
experiments were supported by RFBR (grant No. 15-07-03410a), and Grants Council for State Aid of 
Leading Scientific Schools (RF President grant NSh-860.2014.1). 
References 
[1] Ahn,W., Kim, N. S., Lassaline, M. E., & Dennis, M. J. (2000). Causal status as a determinant of 
feature centrality. Cognitive Psychology, 41, 361–416. 
[2] Cheng, P. (1997). From covariation to causation: A causal power theory. Psychological Review, 
104, 367-405. 
[3] Gopnik, A., Glymour, C., Sobel, D. M., Schulz, L. E., & Kushnir, T. (2004). A theory of causal 
learning in children: Causal maps and Bayes nets. Psychological Review, 111, 3-23. 
[4] Griffiths, T. L., & Tenenbaum, J. B. (2009). Theory-based causal induction. Psychological 
Review, 116, 56. 
 
Uniﬁed formalization of ”natural” classiﬁcation, ”natural” concepts, and consciousness as integrated
information by Giulio Tononi Evgenii Vityaev
176
  
[5] Masafumi Oizumi, Larissa Albantakis, Giulio Tononi. From the Phenomenology to the 
Mechanisms of Consciousness: Integrated Information Theory 3.0 // PLOS Computational 
Biology, May 2014, V.10. Issue 5. 
[6] Meien S.V., Shreider ɋ.Ⱥ. Methodological aspects of classification theory. Philosofical questions. 
v.12, 1976 (in Russian) 
[7] Mill, J.S. System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive. L., 1983. 
[8] Rehder, B., & Hastie, R. (2001). Causal knowledge and categories: The effects of causal beliefs 
on categorization, induction, and similarity. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 130, 
323–360. 
[9] Bob Rehder. Categorization as causal reasoning // Cognitive Science, 27 (2003) 709–748. 
[10] Bob Rehder, Jay B. Martin. Towards A Generative Model of Causal Cycles. In: 33rd Annual 
Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society 2011, (CogSci 2011), Boston, Massachusetts, USA, 20-
23 July 2011, V.1 pp. 2944-2949. 
[11] Rosch, E.H. Natural categories // Cognitive Psychology, 4. P. 328-350. 
[12] Rosch, E., Mervis, C.B. Family resemblances. Studies in the internal structure of categories // 
Cognitive Psychology, 7. P. 573–605. 
[13] Rosch, E., Mervis, C. B., Gray, W. D., Johnson, D. M., Boyes-Braem, P. Basic objects in natural 
categories // Cognitive Psychology, 8. P. 382–439. 
[14] Rosch, Eleanor and Lloyd, Barbara B. (eds), Cognition and categorization. Hillsdale, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum, 1978, P. 27-48. 
[15] Rosch, E., Principles of Categorization. In: Rosch, E. & Lloyd, B.B. (eds), Cognition and 
Categorization, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, (Hillsdale), 1978. P. 27–48 
[16] B. H. Ross, E. G. Taylor, E. L. Middleton, and T. J. Nokes. Concept and Category Learning in 
Humans. In: H. L. Roediger, III (Ed.), Cognitive Psychology of Memory. Vol. [2] of Learning and 
Memory: A Comprehensive Reference, 4 vols. (J.Byrne Editor), Oxford: Elsevier, 2008, P. 535-
556. 
[17] Rutkovskii L. Elementary logic textbook. – Spt., 1884. (in Russian) 
[18] Sloman, S., Love, B. C., & Ahn, W. (1998). Feature centrality and conceptual coherence. 
Cognitive Science, 22, 189–228. 
[19] Smirnof E.S. Constructions of forms from the taxonomic view // Zool. Jour., v.17(3), 1938, 
pp. 387-418. (in Russian) 
[20] The Nature of Classification. Relationships and Kinds in the Natural Sciences. Palgrave 
Macmillan. 2013. 208p. 
[21] Vityaev, E.E.: Knowledge discovery. Computational cognition. Cognitive process models. 
Novosibirsk State University Press, Novosibirsk, 2006, p. 293. (in Russian). 
[22] Evgenii Vityaev. The logic of prediction. In: Mathematical Logic in Asia. Proceedings of the 9th 
Asian Logic Conference (August 16-19, 2005, Novosibirsk, Russia), edited by S.S. Goncharov, R. 
Downey, H. Ono, World Scientific, Singapore, 2006, P. 263-276. 
[23] Vityaev, E.E. A formal model of neuron that provides consistent predictions. In: Biologically 
Inspired Cognitive Archi-tectures 2012. Proceedings of the Third Annual Meeting of the BICA 
Society (A. Chella, R.Pirrone, R. Sorbello, K.R. Johannsdottir, Eds). In Advances in Intelligent 
Systems and Computing, v.196, Springer: Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht, London. 2013, P. 
339-344. 
[24] Vityaev, E.E., Demin, A.V., Ponomaryov, D.K. Probabilistic Generalization of Formal Concepts 
// Programming and Computer Software, 2012, Vol. 38, No. 5. P. 219–230. 
[25] Vityaev, E.E., Martinovich, V.V. Probabilistic Formal Concepts with Negation. In: A. Voronkov, 
I. Virbitskaite (Eds.): PCI 2014, LNCS 8974, P. 385-399. 
[26] Vityaev, E.E., Neuporoev N.V. Formal model of perception and pattern as fix-point of 
anticipations. In: Approaches to the mind modelling. Editorial, Moscow, 2014ɝ., pp. 155-172. 
[27] Zabrodin, V.Yu. (1981) Criteria of naturalness of classifications. NTI, ser. 2. (in Russian) 
Uniﬁed formalization of ”natural” classiﬁcation, ”natural” concepts, and consciousness as integrated
information by Giulio Tononi Evgenii Vityaev
177
